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DESPERATELY SEEKING SERENITY 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS. By Daniel A. Farber1 and Suzanna 
Sherry.2 University of Chicago Press. 2002. Pp. 208. $25.00 
Steven D. Smith3 
It is a common complaint that constitutional argumentation 
(or what is sometimes euphemistically called "reasoned judg-
ment"4), whether issuing from judges or law professors, has be-
come pervasively unpersuasive, unedifying, often downright un-
seemly.5 So, how do we come to find ourselves in this unhappy 
predicament? And is our plight truly desperate, or are the critics 
just overwrought nay-sayers? 
In Desperately Seeking Certainty, two eminent constitutional 
scholars (well known to long-time readers of this journal) offer a 
sweeping but fairly simple-and ultimately upbeat-diagnosis: 
the deficiencies of modern constitutional discourse are largely 
the result of "foundationalism," or of a misconceived quest for 
"grand theory." Though broadly critical of many of the leading 
!.McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law, Henry J. Fletcher Professor 
of Law & Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Development, University of 
Minnesota. 
2. Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership, Vanderbilt University. 
3. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Sai 
Prakash and Larry Alexander for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (Joint Opinion). 
5. Elsewhere, for example, one of the present authorS has described modern Su-
preme Court opinions as "increasingly arid, formalistic, and lacking in intellectual value"; 
they "almost seem designed to wear the reader into submission as much as actually to 
persuade." Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
147, 147, 157 (1994). Another editor of this journal describes Supreme Court opinions as 
"arid, technical, unhelpful, boring, ... unintelligible," "formulaic gobbledygook." But 
legal scholarship is, if possible, even worse: it is "incomprehensible, pretentious, pom-
pous, turgid, revolting, jargonistic gibberish." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. 
Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the 
Twenty-Third Century, 59 Albany L. Rev. 671,674,677 (1995). 
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constitutional thinkers of our time, this diagnosis is also at its 
core an optimistic one, because it suggests that what we basically 
need to do is ... well, just relax. Taking a self-consciously thera-
peutic approach (the book begins and ends with a psychiatrist 
joke), Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry suggest that we need to 
let go of our yearning for an elegant theory of the Constitution, 
or for a secure method of interpreting it, and instead return to 
the eclectic, tried-and-true tactics that lawyers and judges have 
been using for centuries. More specifically, we need to content 
ourselves with "legal pragmatism," or with the methods of the 
"common law" (approaches that the authors treat, surprisingly, 
as approximately equivalent). 
The book's presentation of this cheerfully critical diagnosis 
is perceptive, good-natured, steadfastly (and even ostenta-
tiously) commonsensical, sometimes entertaining, often insight-
ful. Which is not to say, alas, that the diagnosis is right-or that 
the pragmatist therapy is what we need now. 
ROUNDING UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
Farber and Sherry started out, as they explain, to write a 
book criticizing some leading conservative constitutional theo-
rists, but their project soon expanded to include major purveyors 
of "grand theory," both liberal and conservative. Sandwiched in 
between brief introductory and much longer concluding chap-
ters, the book devotes a chapter each to the ideas of six constitu-
tional theorists who are already widely admired and despised: 
Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Richard Epstein, Akhil Amar, 
Bruce Ackerman, and Ronald Dworkin. While praising these 
thinkers for their brilliance and imagination, Farber and Sherry 
find all of their positions seriously deficient. 
Whether or not one agrees with this negative judgment, the 
book's treatment of these prominent thinkers is illuminating. To 
be sure, the presentations vary in depth and seriousness. The au-
thors evidently view Bork as a lightweight and hence decline to 
offer any very serious presentation of his views, limiting them-
selves instead to rehearsing the standard criticisms. (While insist-
ing on "originalism," Bork does not appreciate the difficulty of 
ascertaining original meaning. Bark is "too often sloppy, superfi-
cial, and sometimes inaccurate" in his own history, and he "re-
peatedly ignores or distorts history to reach his own conclu-
sions." (p. 17) And so forth.) Other theorists receive more 
sustained and respectful treatment. Sometimes the authors at-
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tribute greater subtlety to a theorist than cnt1cs typically do. 
Scalia, for example, comes across not so much as a dogmatic true 
believer in rules and "original understanding" as a nuanced and 
tacitly skeptical pragmatist who understands both the deficien-
cies of the doctrines he propounds and the inevitability of the 
doctrines he opposes (such as the "living Constitution"). Scalia 
nonetheless contends ferociously for his views-he pretends, 
with occasional lapses into candor, to be a dogmatic supporter-
because he thinks "it is better for judges to adhere to certain 
myths despite their fictional nature, while maintaining a wise si-
lence about the truth." (p. 38) Whether this portrayal is accurate 
is hard to tell: but at least it is interesting. 
Beyond the individual appraisals, the book's format gener-
ates revealing and sometimes intriguing comparisons of the dif-
ferent theorists. For example, the authors point out that Epstein 
and Ackerman, though seemingly constitutional opposites, "ac-
tu<!lly have a good deal in common." (p. 74) Both scholars are 
obsessed with the New Deal, and both agree in viewing constitu-
tional developments of that period as "a decisive break from the 
original constitutional understanding." (p. 74) Starting from this 
shared judgment, however, Epstein repudiates the New Deal 
while Ackerman struggles to constitutionalize it (mainly through 
his famous theory of the unwritten "Activist State" amendment 
that no one knew about until Ackerman discovered it a few 
years ago).6 Indeed, in his dedication to the New Deal Acker-
man reveals himself as a peculiar sort of conservative (the au-
thors are too polite to say reactionary): "His appeal is ultimately 
conservative: we must retain the legacy of the New Deal-as in-
terpreted and implemented by the Warren Court-not because 
it is right or because we agree with it, but because the depression 
generation told us to." (p. 100) 
So if the New Deal is taken as a reference point, Ackerman 
and Epstein are alike (and also opposite), and are unlike the 
other theorists who do not fixate so fully on that episode in our 
history. But from a different vantage point-that is, respect for 
"populism" or majoritarianism-the affinities shift. Now Ac-
kerman finds himself lumped in with Bork, Scalia, and Amar: all 
privilege majoritarian democracy over individual rights. (p. 143) 
Indeed, the authors suggest that in this respect Amar can be seen 
as a sort of extreme version of Bork. (p. 74) Conversely, "Ep-
6. See also (p. 99): "Ackerman is in this sense almost a mirror image of Richard 
Epstcm, who regards the New Deal as the twilight of American constitutionalism." 
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stein and Dworkin-an odd couple if there ever was one"- are 
paired because they "give primacy to individual rights." (p. 143) 
Beyond these provocative comparisons, however, Farber 
and Sherry argue that all of the theorists share a common-and 
fatal- feature: all are ostensibly committed to what the authors 
call "grand theory," or "foundationalism,"7 and this commitment 
is their undoing. The overarching critical theme of the book is 
that the foundationalist project is "both fundamentally mis-
guided and doomed to failure." (p. 140) Our constitutional his-
tory and system are simply too wildly messy-too beautifully, in-
congruously complicated-to be captured in any elegant theory. 
So the effort to perform this impossible task, whether by conser-
vative or liberal theorists, predictably results in analytical con-
tortions, distortions of the evidence, and embarrassing depar-
tures from old-fashioned common sense-which is just what we 
see, almost everywhere, in contemporary constitutional dis-
course. 
It is an appealing, presumptively plausible depiction -so 
plausible, in fact, that one might wonder how so many bright 
scholars could have overlooked the obvious, and how so many 
other scholars and students and lawyers could have been sucked 
into such a patently misguided quest. How to account for the ap-
parently irresistible attraction of "grand theory" over the past 
generation or so? Farber and Sherry are sensitive to this ques-
tion, and they offer an answer-more than one answer, in fact. 
THE WILL TO THEORIZE 
The title already suggests one recurring and primarily psy-
chological theme: the theorists and their followers have been 
driven by an overweening desire for certainty-about what 
courts should do, or about the meaning of the Constitution. 
Thus, "[g]rand theorists ... yearn for certitude, for something 
more definite than the rather fuzzy process of reasoning by anal-
ogy and developing principles piecemeal." (p. 153) Or their 
7. Farber and Sherry variously describe the target of their central criticism as 
"master theory," the quest for a "universal method of interpretation that will serve as a 
recipe for judges faced with any constitutional issue," (p. 140) theory which "seeks to 
ground all of constitutional law on a single foundation," (p. 1) and theory which "elevates 
a single value above all others." (p. 56) Whether they are correct to equate "grand the-
ory" (if that is what the theorists discussed here are guilty of) with "foundationalism" is 
an interesting question, but one that cannot be pursued here. 
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theories reflect "a bitter longing for a world of stable values and 
social solidarity .... " (p. 165) 
This explanation of modern theorizing latches onto and ap-
plies to constitutional scholars a familiar assessment of what is 
sometimes thought of as the "Cartesian" project: smitten with 
paralyzing doubt, thinkers like Descartes or Locke imagine-
though vainly-that they can achieve intellectual security by de-
vising just the right theory or articulating the infallible epistemic 
method.8 In applying this received diagnosis to their contempo-
raries in the legal academy, Farber and Sherry might be right: 
perhaps Ackerman, Dworkin, Amar and company are afflicted 
with an unhealthy intellectual insecurity issuing in a compulsive 
need for certainty.9 But in fact the authors produce very little 
evidence to confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, in trying to support 
it they at times appear to fall into the very error that they accuse 
their subjects of making-that is, distorting the evidence in an 
effort to force the material to fit a preconceived and relatively 
simplistic thesis. 
For example, though Farber and Sherry argue that Robert 
Bork naively believes that historical research will yield clear, 
definite "orifainal meanings," Bork in fact explicitly disavows this 
assumption. And though the fundamental mistake the authors 
ascribe to these thinkers is their supposed penchant for single-
value theories, it is not always easy to see how this description 
fits: by the authors' own account it would seem that at least some 
of their subjects in fact are committed, consciously and explicitly, 
to multi-value views of the law. Scalia, for example, believes in 
8. See, e.g., Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity 
(Free Press, 1990); Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, 
Hermeneutics, and Pratis (U. Penn. Press, 1983). 
9. However, the authors also suggest other ways of viewing this central motiva-
tion-as a quest not for certainty, perhaps, but for intellectual beauty-see (p. 57) (de-
scribing desire for theories that arc "intellectually elegant")-or perhaps power and im-
portance. (p. 57) (theories seeking "intellectual grandeur"). In addition, the authors 
repeatedly suggest that all of these theorists use theory to advance political agendas. 
10. Compare (p. 13) ("[Bork] assumes not only that the Constitution has a single, 
authoritative meaning, but also that modern interpreters can easily discern that mean-
ing.") with Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 
163 (Free Press, 1990): 
We must not expect too much of the search for original understanding in any 
legal context. The result of the search is never perfection; it is simply the best 
we can do; and the best we can do must be regarded as good enough-or we 
must abandon the enterprise of law and, most especially, that of judicial re-
view .... The precise congruence of individual decisions with what the ratifiers 
intended can never be known, but it can be estimated whether, across a body of 
decisions, judges have in general vindicated the principle given into their hands. 
If they accomplish that much, they have accomplished something of great value. 
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following original meaning, but he also makes room for prece-
dent, "tradition" -and probably, at least by the authors' own ac-
count, even for disguised deference to contemporary sensibili-
ties. (pp. 36-54) Dworkin believes in both "fit" and 
"justification" in constitutional interpretation. (pp. 132-33) 
Amar's work suggests a delightfully imaginative-or, if you pre-
fer, thoroughly unmoored-thinker whose besetting weakness 
hardly seems to be that of tying himself down to a "single value." 
(Ch. 5) 
But suppose these theorists and their devotees do exhibit an 
excessive need for "certainty." We would still be pressed to 
wonder: Why should a need for certainty be especially promi-
nent, and contagious, during the last generation or so? What ac-
counts for the power, over this period, of this supposed need for 
certainty? 
In response to that sort of "Why now?" question, the au-
thors tell another familiar though more political story- the story 
of the "countermajoritarian difficulty." In the post-Brown pe-
riod, scholars became obsessed with the problem of reconciling 
judicial review with the nation's democratic commitments, and 
this obsession manifested itself in a profusion of "grand theo-
ries." (p. 144-45) But this morbid fixation is unhealthy and gra-
tuitous. So Farber and Sherry, acting now as constitutional 
therapists, try to treat the obsession by offering a variety of 
soothing counsels calculated to convince us that the counterma-
joritarian difficulty is no big deal. 11 What is important, they sug-
gest, is not that every specific institution or practice be democ-
ratic, but rather that the system as a whole be essentially 
democratic: and ours is. And in any case, "we the people" them-
selves-ourselves?-accept and expect judicial review. (pp. 142-
51) 
There is surely a measure of truth in these observations. 
Constitutional theorists and other critics have often worried 
about the countermajoritarian difficulty, or have charged the 
Court with being undemocratic12 (and those inclined to this con-
cern may not be wholly consoled by the authors' assurances, for 
example, that "it is not clear that the Court is radically less 'de-
mocratic' than other organs of government considered in isola-
11. "Although the countcrmajoritarian difficulty has a core of truth, it has been 
blown out of proportion." (p. 145). 
12. Sec, e.g., MitchellS. Muncy, cd., The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpa-
tion of Politics (Spence Pub., 1997). 
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tion" (p. 148, emphasis in original)). But is this a sufficient ac-
count of the impulse to theorize that has animated a good deal of 
constitutional scholarship over the last generation or so? 
Suppose we frame the question in this way: If constitutional 
scholars were convinced (by arguments such as those offered in 
this book) that the countermajoritarian difficulty is nothing to 
worry about, would their reasons for theorizing disappear? 
Would theory-including "grand" or "foundationalist" theory-
dry up? Frankly, it is hard to see how or why any such develop-
ment would occur. Even if we put aside our concerns about de-
mocracy, wouldn't we still need to think about how courts 
should decide cases, or how to figure out what the Constitution 
means, or what it even means to say that "the Constitution 
means" this or that? It mar be that theory is finally incapable of 
answering those questions. 3 But the questions are central, and it 
is hard to see how the disappearance of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty would make theory either more or less promising as a 
way of addressing such questions. 
So then in that world-the world somehow relieved of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty-what exactly would theorists be 
seeking? Certainty? Perhaps-but not necessarily. Democracy-
or at least a reconciliation of judicial power with democracy? 
No, because we have already stipulated that concern away. But 
then what? 
The answer seems at once so simple and yet, on modern 
pragmatic assumptions, so unhelpful and almost ungraspable 
that one is almost embarrassed to say it: the theorists would be 
looking for. .. law. They would be seeking to explain, that is, 
how the decisions the courts render in the name of the Constitu-
tion are in fact what the courts have always said they are-that 
is, a product of or a response to something that can plausibly be 
called "law." 
And indeed, there is good reason to suppose that this is 
what at least some of the theorists discussed in this book are 
primarily about: their theories are designed to show how "consti-
tutional law" is-or at least can be-law. To be sure, such theo-
ries might not establish the specific content of that law with cer-
tainty, but then where exactly did the theorists ever actually 
13. To a large extent, I share the authors' skepticism about the possibility of theory 
that would dictate the decisions in constitutional cases, at least in the areas with which I 
am most familiar. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Getting Over Equality: A Critical Diagnosis 
of Religious Freedom in America 45-82 (New York U. Press, 2001 ). 
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promise such certainty? And although the concern about judicial 
usurpation of democracy surely adds urgency to the task, the 
need to understand how constitutional law is law would press 
upon the theorists-and upon us-even if we had never heard or 
thought of that concern. By this view, in short, what the theorists 
are "desperately seeking" is neither certainty (although, come to 
think of it, a little more certainty would be nice) nor even de-
mocracy (though democracy is nothing to sneer at), but rather 
law. 
So why is it that this possible purpose does not even seem to 
occur to seasoned scholars like Farber and Sherry? We need to 
reflect on this puzzling situation a bit more closely. 
IS LAW AN ISSUE? 
We can start with the classic statement: "It is emphatically 
the duty and province of the judicial department to say what the 
law is." 14 This statement, we understand, is a fundamental pre-
supposition of judicial review. But what sort of statement is it? 
And what does its reference to "the law" contemplate? 
In part, of course, the statement is a claim to institutional 
authority. In context, though, it is plain that "say[ing] what the 
law is" is not meant to be equivalent to "making the law," much 
less to "making up the law" -whether wisely or pragmatically or 
otherwise. Marbury's premise, rather, is that there is something 
that exists independent of the courts- "the law"-which the 
courts are supposed to understand and declare. Thus, Marbury's 
claim of authority is not based on a mere tautology (as it would 
be if, for instance, "the law" were understood to be nothing 
other than "what the courts say"). Indeed, that sort of tautologi-
cal understanding would negate Marbury's claim; what looks like 
an affirmation from which important conclusions might be 
drawn would dissolve into the feckless observation that "it is our 
job, as judges, to ... well, say what we say." In short, it is this 
presumptively judge-independent thing- "the law"- that sup-
plies the justification for the claim to institutional authority; so if 
that independent thing were somehow found not to exist, the 
claim to judicial authority would presumably disappear along 
with it. 
But now let us fast forward, and suppose that this notion of 
what we can call the judge-independent law comes to seem prob-
14. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,177 (1803). 
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lematic. Distinguished legal thinkers (some of them associated 
with what comes to be called "legal pragmatism") teach that 
"law" does not exist "objectively" or "on its own," so to speak; 
rather, "law" is at bottom nothing more than what judges (and 
other officials) say and do. 15 And the Supreme Court at least 
sometimes seems to acce~t this jurisprudential account in its own 
constitutional decisions. 6 So the judge-independent status of 
"the law" is called into question. 
How should we react to this development- one which, if 
embraced, would preclude the very possibility of law in the 
older, more "objective" sense while guaranteeing law in the 
newer tautological sense? And what are the implications of this 
more modern jurisprudential understanding for judicial author-
ity, and in particular for that embattled practice we call "judicial 
review"? One can imagine quite opposite reactions. Probably 
the most logical conclusion would be that the "legitimacy" of the 
institution of judicial review has been thrown into doubt. If it is 
emphatically the courts' province to "say what the law is," then if 
it turns out that "the law" in the sense contemplated in this claim 
does not exist, the courts' province would seem to encompass, 
emphatically, ... nothing. 
But the exact opposite reaction, though perhaps not as logi-
cal,17 is also readily imaginable. The legitimacy of the courts' au-
thority depends on their saying "what the law is," we might rea-
son; but once we come to understand that what the courts say 
just is law, then judicial legitimacy might thereby seem to be se-
cured. To be sure, there will still be crucial questions about how 
courts should exercise their authority-about how to tell which 
decisions are wise or unwise, just or unjust. These are the ques-
tions worth talking about. But questions like "Did the court cor-
rectly state 'the law' in this case?" or "Did the court exceed its 
15. In particular, Oliver Wendell Holmes (who has been adopted as a sort of patron 
saint by modern legal pragmatists) sometimes argued that we should think of law as 
nothing more than a set of predictions about what judges will do. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457-61 (1897). See also Richard A. 
Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 225 (Harvard U. Press, 1990) ("The law is not a 
thing [judges] discover; it is the name of their activity. They do not act in accordance with 
something called 'law'- they just act as best they can .... The important thing is that law 
is something that licensed persons, mainly judges, lawyers, and legislators, do .... ") 
(footnote omitted). 
16. Though it did not say so in just these words, the Court's decision in Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958), is often taken to have asserted in essence that "the Con-
stitution means what the Supreme Court says it means." 
17. This reaction is not as logical because it rests on an equivocation about the 
meaning of "law." 
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authority?" or "Is this decision 'legitimate'?" will come to seem 
obtuse, embarrassing, almost unintelligible. People who ask such 
questions will seem like the child who asks, "Mommy, does that 
bachelor over there have a wife?" So a charitable observer (and 
Farber and Sherry are, at least in this book, charitable observers) 
will assume that a brilliant theorist is not asking that sort of 
pointless question. 
This is not the place to consider in detail how this terse ac-
count correlates with our actual jurisprudential and constitu-
tional history. 18 Suffice it to say that the notion of a law-and in 
particular a constitutional law-subsisting independent of the 
judges had by the mid-twentieth century come to seem, to many 
at least, deeply problematic. Decisions like Brown and Gris-
wold-and later, even more so, Roe-underscored and aggra-
vated the difficulty by subverting the possibility of equating "the 
law" with some judge-independent thing such as "the text" (as 
Marbury, with its almost incessant references to the "written" 
Constitution, at least seemed to have done). And at least some 
of the theorists studied by Farber and Sherry-surely Bork and 
Scalia among the conservatives, I think, and Dworkin among the 
liberals-have perceived the challenge to judicial authority in-
herent in this situation. Their theorizing has been centrally ani-
mated by the purpose of showing how constitutional law is-or 
can be- "law" in a sense more robust than the tautological sense 
of "law is whatever the judges say": Dworkin's resounding "I call 
it law" might be taken as a sort of slogan for much of the work in 
the area of constitutional theory.19 
Farber and Sherry do not pick up on this central purpose, 
however, seemingly because the question of whether and how 
constitutional law is "law" does not trouble them-or even (for 
all we can tell from this book) occur to them. In the tradition of 
18. For a preliminary attempt, sec Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999). For a more careful book-length version, see Steven D. Smith, 
Law's Quandary (Harvard U. Press, forthcoming 2004). The jurisprudential claims made 
in the remainder of this review are discussed in these writings. 
19. Sec Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 71 (Harvard U. Press, 1985): 
We have an institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power 
politics to the forum of principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest, most 
fundamental conflicts between individual and society will once, someplace, fi-
nally, become questions of justice. I do not call that religion or prophecy. I call 
it law. 
Dworkin's later book, Law's Empire (Harvard U. Press, 1986), reads as an extended vin-
dication of this "I call it law" claim. And see Bark, The Tempting of America at 143-45, 
353-54 (cited in note 10); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1175 (1989). 
2002] BOOK REVIEWS 533 
"legal pragmatism," they seem to assume that whatever the 
courts dispense is, by definition, "law." The important questions 
concern how courts should go about doing their dispensing; so 
these are the questions they are interested in, and the questions 
they assume the theorists they criticize are primarily interested 
in as well. So if theorists claim to be concerned about how con-
stitutional law is law, Farber and Sherry naturally assume that 
this is an oblique way of expressing some other, more substantial 
concern-about, for example, "certainty." 
In making this assumption, Farber and Sherry misdiagnose 
the central purpose driving at least some of the theorists they 
discuss. But beyond that, they also forfeit the possibility of un-
derstanding a vital dimension of the legal tradition to which they 
claim to wish to return. 
MUDDLING TOWARDS ... WHAT? 
For Farber and Sherry, the failure of "grand theory" is not 
alarming, because they think we are better off adopting "legal 
pragmatism" anyway. But what exactly is legal pragmatism?20 
Richard Rorty, perhaps the foremost pragmatist philosopher of 
our time, acknowledges that "'[p]ragmatism' is a vague, ambigu-
ous, and overworked word."21 And for those who find the posi-
tion or orientation elusive,22 Desperately Seeking Certainty will 
not provide much help. We know what the authors think prag-
matism is not-it is not interpreting the Constitution according 
to any "master" or "single-value" theory. But that negative de-
scription still leaves us wondering what pragmatism is. And 
while the book's presentation is stalwartly calm and sensible and 
occasionally even wise23 - virtues, I concede, not to be taken for 
20. The authors describe pragmatism as an approach that will "weigh text and his-
tory, precedent and policy, principle and consequences. No single factor is dispositive, 
and the persuasiveness of the result ultimately depends on a blend of statesmanship and 
workman-like lawyering." (p. 3). 
21. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980) 160 (U. Min-
nestoa Press, 1982). Rorty immediately adds that "[n]everthcless, it names the chief glory 
of our country's intellectual tradition." 
22. I am one such. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 Yale L.J. 
409 (1990). 
23. See, e.g., (p. 151): 
Grand theories attribute a degree of normative coherence to the constitutional 
regime that docs not exist. Substantively, the Constitution is not based on an 
overarching vision of the division of powers, or sweeping philosophical theories 
about rights. The framers made use of their best theoretical understandings, but 
they were designing a practical instrument of government, not a class project for 
a pohl!cal theory course .... Grand theory embodies a reductionist vision of 
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granted in legal scholarship-considered as a whole the book 
also irresistibly provokes the suspicion that "legal pragmatism" 
is little more than a placeholder for "whatever seems the right 
thing to do in the particular circumstances." Or, more negatively, 
a polite slogan for "We-all of us-don't know what the heck 
we're doing, but we somehow seem to manage anyway."24 
Thus, the authors sometimes equate pragmatism with the 
"common law" approach which, as they explain, has been used 
by courts since the Middle Ages. (pp. 152-56) But this equation 
is dubious, to say the least. Judges and scholars in the older 
common law tradition depicted themselves as finding and declar-
ing "the law"; they would likely have been horrified at a depic-
tion of them as ungrounded ("No foundations!") pragmatists 
happily deciding cases in whatever fashion local common sense 
or sentiment might indicate. And indeed, many of the standard 
techniques of common law reasoning-the intricate and deferen-
tial use of precedent, for example, or the retroactive application 
even of novel decisions-are hard to account for convincingly 
within a pragmatic framework. 25 Hence, other leading propo-
nents of legal pragmatism-Holmes, for instance, or Judge Pos-
ner-have often (and more plausibly) portrayed the common 
law approach not as an embodiment of pragmatism, but rather 
as something that pragmatism should seek to overcome.26 Farber 
and Sherry for the most part claim to align themselves with Pos-
ner-and Posner reciprocates with a (somewhat faintly) lauda-
tory blurb on the book jacket-but the union, I fear, is thin and 
mostly verbal. 
Farber and Sherry also repeatedly insist that their pragmatic 
approach would be "eclectic": unlike theorists who have favored 
using "framer's intentions" or "text" or "policy" or "philosophy" 
as "single-value" controlling criteria, they want decisions to re-
flect a little of all of these factors: a pinch of this, a smidgeon of 
that. In the same spirit, they suggest that legal scholars ought to 
devote their attention primarily to four sorts of enterprises: care-
constitutionalism, which cannot do justice to the untidy grandeur of our consti-
tutional regime. 
24. Of course, I don't mean to deny the accuracy of this observation. Cf. Linda 
Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 Georgetown L.J. 647, 650-51 (1998) ("In-
deed, both Karl Llewellyn and Benjamin Cardozo concluded that judges themselves have 
no idea how they do what they do."). 
25. For further discussion, see Smith, 40 B. C. L. Rev. at 1053-65 (cited in note 18); 
Smith, Law's Quandary, ch. 3 (cited in note 18). 
26. This perspective is nicely reflected in the title of one of Posner's books: Over-
coming Law (Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
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ful doctrinal analysis, social science research and application, his-
torical research, and comparative law study. (pp. 142, 165-68) 
There is something fetchingly ecumenical about this attitude: 
"Let a thousand flowers bloom." Even so, it is an incongruous 
list. In the past, proponents of social sciences in law have often 
favored this approach precisely because they have viewed con-
ventional doctrinal analysis as manipulable and barren. Simi-
larly, in "The Path of the Law" Holmes advocated the develop-
ment of a more scientific approach to law as a way of escaping 
the controlling grip of tradition and history. By contrast, Farber 
and Sherry seem blithely unconcerned about possible incom-
patibilities in their list of factors and approaches-like someone 
whose political philosophy boils down to "Why don't we all just 
get along?" 
The deeper problem, however, is not just that Farber and 
Sherry provide no formula for combining the disparate factors 
and concerns that they think should guide constitutional adjudi-
cation. They would say, quite plausibly, that no such formula is 
possible, and that in fact constitutional adjudication has been in-
fluenced by all of these approaches.Z7 But the problem is that 
their account leaves us in the dark about what constitutional de-
cisions should even be aiming at. 
As discussed, it is no help to say that courts should try to 
declare or implement "the law": depending on what sense of 
"law" we are using, that objective is on the pragmatist concep-
tion either impossible (because the "objective" law doesn't exist) 
or inevitable (because whatever courts say is law). So then what 
should the law be striving for? Justice? Equal concern and re-
spect? Wealth maximization? The greatest amount of happiness 
for the greatest number? High public approval ratings? Survival 
of the species?28 It is well enough to say that in the absence of 
any single-value formula or theory to determine our decisions, 
we must "muddle through." Still, it would be nice to know what 
we ought to be muddling towards. And perhaps the most deeply 
unsatisfying aspect of what is in many ways an admirable book is 
that Farber and Sherry give no clue-none, at least, that I could 
27. However, to give even an accurate account of the diverse factors that have in-
fluenced decisions in the past-by working on different actors and at different levels of 
cognition or in non-cognitive ways-is not necessarily to say anything helpful to a current 
decision-maker about how she should go about actually making a decision. 
28. This list represents a sort of rhetorical question, of course, but I concede that it 
is not unanswerable. Indeed, I can almost hear Farber and Sherry responding: "Yes! All 
of the above, without limitation. Whatever is good-whatever anyone thinks is good-
we're for it." 
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discern-about what the destination of our muddling ought to 
be.Z9 
THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC OF 
COMPLACENCY? 
Books can be valuable in different ways-some of them in-
tended, some not. Desperately Seeking Certainty is valuable, I be-
lieve, in both ways. As discussed, the book provides an engaging 
and insightful discussion of some of the leading constitutional 
theorists of our time. By appraising these theories against the 
backdrop of the authors' own more pragmatic and theory-
skeptical perspective, the book also manages to convey a 
broader picture of the major alternatives in constitutional 
thought available today. It gives us a sense of our times, of the 
ways we can live and think now-and thereby underscores the 
thoroughly unsatisfactory condition of the modern constitutional 
situation. That is because although Farber and Sherry want their 
picture to be a happy one, it is hard to find anything to feel 
hopeful about in the offerings of either the theorizers or the the-
ory-skeptics. 
But perhaps this pessimism just expresses an unhealthy, un-
necessary clinging to what is sometimes called "the Cartesian 
anxiety."30 Perhaps the solution, as Farber and Sherry counsel, is 
to just let go. At the heart of the essentially therapeutic anti-
theory impulse is an inviting intuition: If we could somehow just 
stop thinking about our problems, maybe they wouldn't be prob-
lems for us anymore. Right? The approach seems to work-and 
whether something "works" (whatever that means) is after all 
what pragmatists care about, isn't it?- for lots of people. Proba-
bly it is the way most of us deal with most of the difficulties and 
doubts that might otherwise trouble us: stop worrying about 
them. 
Thus, in the midst of their efforts to treat away the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty, Farber and Sherry offer a revealing 
observation: other governmental features besides judicial review 
(such as the composition of the Senate) are also less than de-
mocratic, but "the fact is that hardly anyone really cares .... " (p. 
149, emphasis added) They are probably right, and the point 
29. Farber and Sherry indicate, however, that they are contemplating a sequel to 
this book. Perhaps the sequel might address some of these questions. 
30. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism at 16 (cited in note 8). 
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might be applicable more generally- to most of the issues con-
sidered in this book, for example (and in this review). Perhaps 
that is the book's real prescription and the real antidote to 
"grand theory": not anything even as vaguely dignified and 
residually theoretical as "legal pragmatism" or the "common law 
method," but just good old-fashioned complacency. 
Still, there is something odd-and perhaps a hint of quiet 
desperation-in a situation in which whole books are written in 
quest of such quiescence. So it makes you wonder.31 And in any 
case, let us hope for the authors' sake- because this is a book 
deserving attention- that this therapy does not prevail until after 
the theorists and the people at risk of becoming theorists buy 
and read Desperately Seeking Certainty. 
31. Surely I am not alone, for example, in detecting a trace of (apparently inadver-
tent) irony in the following citation: Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obses-
sion: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Pan Five, 112 Yale L. J. 153 
(2002). 
